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SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT
ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we develop a cryptographic primitive: a solution to the secure
set membership problem. The secure set membership problem is the problem of
creating a set representation so that it is possible to verify that a string is a member
of the set without being able to learn members of the set from the representation.
The secure set membership primitive includes a distributed protocol for set es-
tablishment and a proof-of-possession protocol to show set membership without
revealing the member of the set.
We use a subset of the instances of the 3SAT witness-ﬁnding problem in devel-
oping a new complexity assumption for the secure set membership primitive. It is
risky to base cryptosystems on NP-complete problems, aswhatishard in the worst
case may be easy in most cases. To mitigate this risk, we limit the instances of 3SAT
that we generate to try to select only hard instances; our complexity assumption is
different than mere NP-completeness.
We assume that 3SAT instances with certain parameters are difﬁcult to ﬁnd
witnesses for. We back up this assumption with experiments using the MiniSAT
SAT solver as well as our own software. We use these experiments to determine
which parameters are most likely to yield a secure system.
We suggest applications of secure set membership including anonymous dig-
ital credentials, accounts with multiple users, access control lists, and document
timestamping. We include both centralized and distributed protocols for estab-
lishing the set, and both pseudonomynous and anonymous protocols for verifying
that a user possesses a witness that is a member of the set.iv
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Introduction
In order to cope with new technologies such as quantum computing and the
possibility of developing new algorithms, new cryptosystems should be devel-
oped based on a diverse set of unrelated complexity assumptions so that one tech-
nique will not break more than a handful of systems.
The mostpopularcomputational foundation for cryptographic security ishard-
ness assumptions based on number-theoretic problems such as factoring, discrete
logarithm, and elliptic logarithm [DH76, RSA78, BF03]. These problems are all re-
lated, so if one is broken it is likely that they all will be broken. (See [dM04] for fur-
ther discussion of this.) Their security is not proven and is likely to either remain
unproven or be broken. They are also vulnerable to quantum attacks, such as those
pioneered by Shor [Sho94]. It is desirable to have many kinds of cryptographic
primitives whose security is based on a wide array of unrelated assumptions, so
that if one system is compromised, they are not necessarily all compromised. In
this thesis, we present a system based on an alternative logic-based assumption
that does not appear to be closely related to these other assumptions.
Speciﬁcally, we consider the use of the well known Boolean satisﬁability prob-
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lem to provide a very general cryptographic primitive, secure set membership. Se-
cure set membership can be used to provide digital credentials, with or without
identiﬁcation, as well as for some signature problems such as timestamping. For
example, consider a system for maintaining encrypted PINs for credit cards. Each
credit card may have multiple PINs (for multiple users); any solution should hide
the PINs in such a way that the system accepts valid PINs, but nobody can deter-
mine any valid PIN that he does not already know. Ifthe system isused in a setting
in which it is reasonable for the system to be able to determine which user it is talk-
ing to, then it is possible for the system to simply store hashes of all the valid PINs
and compare a received hashed PIN with this list to determine if it is valid. This
is an example of credentials with identiﬁcation. However, if the users of the credit
card do not want to identify themselves, or if the credit card issuer prefers to have
users not identify themselves, except as a valid user of the credit card in question,
when they make a purchase, then this results in the goal of anonymous credentials.
For anonymous credentials, the user wants to prove that he has valid credentials
without giving the credentials away.
In Chapter4, weprovide a meansfor constructing a secure set membership sys-
tem that can be used both for credentials with identiﬁcation and for anonymous
credentials. Secure set membership can be used as an alternative to digital signa-
tures for some applications including timestamping [BdM94]. We note that our
system has the desirable property that each participant can choose her own set el-
ements. In the setting of digital credentials, this allows participants to choose their
credential values (rather than having them determined by a third party or as an
output of a distributed credential generation algorithm), thus making the system
suitable for use with credentials that are determined by user-chosen passwords or
biometrics.CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
Our proposed solution is based on the Boolean satisﬁability problem (SAT),
which has not previously been used for digital credentials. The 3SAT problem is
SAT with three terms per clause. Any SAT instance can be written as a 3SAT in-
stance in polynomial time [GJ79]. We are aware that the use of the problem of
ﬁnding witnesses for 3SAT instances as a security assumption is unusual and the
practice of basing cryptographic hardness on NP-completeness is shaky in gen-
eral, because the worst case hardness required for NP-completeness does not say
anything about most cases or the expected case. However, we think it is of inter-
est nonetheless. First, algorithmic advances and new computing models threaten
many of the commonly used cryptographic assumptions, such as the hardness of
factoring. Secondly, SAT is perhaps one of the most studied NP-complete prob-
lems, and a fair bit is known about how to choose instances that appear to be hard.
We discuss this further in Section 4.4 and Chapter 5 in the context of our proposed
solution. To introduce complexity, in Chapter 2 we discuss complexity results for
cryptography. In Chapter 3 we give deﬁnitions that we will use later in this the-
sis. In Chapter 4 we present the system and discuss security and performance. In
Chapter 5 we give an overall discussion of our system.
Our contribution includes three protocols with applications to anonymous cre-
dentials, credentials with identiﬁcation, accounts with multiple users, and digital
timestamping. Speciﬁcally, we provide a method for generating representations of
sets of provided elements. We also provide a method of using a resulting repre-
sentation to prove a particular element was in the set at the time the representation
was generated and a method of using the representation to show a party holds
a valid set element without revealing the element itself. Our representations are
random 3SAT instances of a particular form that accepts the chosen witnesses. We
show (Theorem 1) that among 3SAT instances that accept the selected witnessesCHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4
our algorithm can produce any 3SAT instance that has the selected number of
clauses. The security of the scheme relies on the computational difﬁculty of ﬁnd-
ing satisfying assignments to such 3SAT instances. Our system has the following
properties:
• It generates instances of 3SAT that are satisﬁed by a given set of strings.
• It generates any suitable instance of 3SAT. This is shown in Theorem 1.
• In combination with zero knowledge proofs for 3SAT, it provides interactive
proofs that can be used for anonymous credentials.
• Assuming the 3SAT instances generated are appropriately hard, it provides
security against an attacker either ﬁnding a participant’s element from the
information needed to verify set membership or ﬁnding other bit strings that
satisfy the set membership problem.
There are several applications that motivate consideration of secure set mem-
bership. Some of these applications are not well addressed by our speciﬁc system
due to limitations in the number of witnesses that can be supported, but they re-
main as a motivation to work on the secure set membership problem.
DIGITAL CREDENTIALS. Our system applies to anonymous credentials in a fairly
straightforward manner. The credentials are the elements. They are generated us-
ing either the centralized protocol or the distributed protocol and they are veriﬁed
using the proof of possession protocol. In this way, the credentials are all gen-
erated at once and then the instance is distributed to the veriﬁers. Veriﬁers use
the instance to anonymously determine whether a member is credentialed. If cre-
dentials with identiﬁcation are desired, the member can present his witness; theCHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5
veriﬁer can then check that the witness satisﬁes the instance.
ACCOUNTS WITH MULTIPLE USERS. The system is also useful in situations where
there need to be multiple authentication strings for a single account. An example
is accounts with multiple users. Suppose there are three debit cards issued on one
bank account and they all have the same number but each has a different PIN. The
PINs can then be used as witnesses in constructing an instance. When a user wants
to demonstrate that she is an authorized user of the account, she runs the proof of
possession protocol using her PIN. This way, joint holders of an account can access
the account without giving away their PINs (which might also be used for other
accounts that are not shared even though this is not recommended practice).
Other applications of multiple user accounts include the use of RFID tags as
witnesses in an access control system based on proximity sensors and other access
control situations where it is not desirable to uniquely identify the user.
ACCESS CONTROL LISTS. On some multiuser servers, such as ﬁle servers, it may
be desirable to have an access control list for a resource such as a ﬁle or a directory
in a format that does not immediately yield the identities of the users who may ac-
cess this resource. A straightforward encoding of the users’ identities would yield
to a dictionary attack. The user could, however, keep an access token which is only
known tothe user. Theusercouldthen useasetmembershipprotocol toprove that
he is in the access control list. The access control list could be extended by keeping
more than one instance. The access control list instances could be generated in a
variety of ways including by the authorized parties.
DOCUMENT TIMESTAMPING. Document timestamping [BdM91, BdM94] may re-
quire a little more explanation. In document timestamping applications, we thinkCHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 6
of the distributed protocol as a distributed signature. All the parties participating
in the protocol are attesting that one of their number knew each witness at the time
the protocol was run by accepting the set that results from the protocol. It would
not be possible for the protocol participant to execute the protocol and then choose
a satisfying witness at some later date.
The timestamping system proceeds in rounds. All documents submitted dur-
ing the same round are considered to be simultaneous, like patent applications
arriving at the patent ofﬁce on the same day. Each participant’s witness is a hash
of the document(s) she would like to timestamp. The distributed protocol is run,
and everyone remembers the round’s set, which is the timestamp. The parties may
jointly publish it if they wish to allow anyone to verify a timestamp.
To verify that a document was submitted during a given round, the veriﬁer
merely needs to run the set membership protocol. The security of this system
does not depend on computational security, in that if a cheating prover wishes to
make his speciﬁc document appear to be timestamped and it does not satisfy the
3SAT instance, there is nothing he can do to change that. (We note, though, that in
most practical settings, the adversary may be able to change his document in ways
that do not affect its meaning, but do affect its encoding into a bit string, so this
guarantee is not absolute [LdW05, WYY05b, WYY05a]).
Digital timestamping can be used for intellectual property disputes, among
other applications. In the intellectual property application, a consortium generates
a timestamp with each company using a hash of the hashes of all of its documents.
Each company retains the daily timestamp and publishes it for other interested
parties. In a patent dispute, for instance, a party can get all the other honest par-
ticipants to attest to its possession of a document on or before a certain date. This
could also be used to prevent backdating in stock or other business transactions.CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7
A preliminary version of the work in Chapter 4 appeared at the Eighth Inter-
national Conference on Information and Communications Security [dMW06]. We
introduce the problem of secure set membership and provide a candidate solution
for it. We also did experiments to both determine what parameters to use and to
test our security assumptions.
Our contribution, in summary, is that we:
• Deﬁne the secure set-membership problem.
• Propose amethodtosolve thesecuresetmembershipproblem usingatrusted
central authority.
• Propose a method to solve the secure set membership problem using a group
of authorities who are not individually trusted.
• Experimentally determine recommended parameters of the system.
• Experimentally investigate the security of the system.Chapter 2
Related Work
The set membership problem was ﬁrst addressed by Benaloh and de Mare
with one-way accumulators in 1993 [BdM94]. A number of schemes based on
one-way accumulators were developed including schemes for digital credentials
[CL02, BP97]. The schemes for credentials typically differ from the other schemes,
which tend to concentrate on the idea of a distributed signature, in several ways.
These include central authorities in the credential scheme, as well assupport of ad-
ditional properties such as revocation. All these schemes depend on the difﬁculty
of the RSA problem for their security.
Another approach to set membership is to use Merkle trees or similar tree-
based methods to store the elements of the set [Mer82, Mer88, BdM91]. In these
methods, each participant retains a certiﬁcate and her own set element. In effect,
each element of the set is signed by a central authority. However, these methods
are either not storage-efﬁcient or require more than a constant amount of time to
check relative to the number of entries. For instance logarithmic time is optimal
for Merkle trees [Szy04].
In a credential system, members of the credentialed group have, or are given,
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credentials that they can use to prove their membership in the set of authorized
persons, without revealing which of the members they are. Biometric data may be
used to prevent transferability of credentials, together with zero knowledge proofs
of knowledge, for a group member to prove to a veriﬁer that she holds a valid
credential without revealing it. Anonymous credentials have been widely stud-
ied and solutions based on various cryptographic assumptions have been given
(e.g. [CL01, CL02, Acq03, IM03]).
Several approaches have been taken to digital credentials. Most of these ap-
proaches require a central authority (such as [BdM94, CL02]), though some ap-
proaches based on one-way accumulators do not require a central authority. Our
approach can work with or without a central authority. The combination of one-
way accumulators and zero-knowledge proofs was introduced by Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya [CL02]. Other credential systems allow revocation of anonymity (e.g.
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL01]).
Our work makes use of the assumed computational difﬁculty of ﬁnding satis-
fying assignments to certain kinds of satisﬁable 3SAT instances. A related use of
the hardness of SAT for achieving security has been proposed for hiding informa-
tion in anomaly detection applications [EAFH04, EFH04a, EFH04b, Esp05]. Their
work is concerned with maintaining lists of information that, if compromised, will
not compromise the larger system for applications such as intrusion detection. The
central idea of our system is to represent an element of a set by an assignment to a
set of variables, and the set of elements by a 3SAT instance that is satisﬁed by the
corresponding assignments. In comparison, the work of Esponda et al. uses a SAT
instance to represent a database; in their case, they represent the values not in the
database by satisfying assignments.
We note that both our use of 3SAT and Esponda et al.’s use of SAT do not haveCHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 10
the same difﬁculties as earlier uses of NP-complete problems for cryptography,
such as the knapsack problem (see [Odl90] for a nice survey of this history), be-
cause it is not necessary to embed a trapdoor to be used for operations such as
decryption.
In this chapter, we explore what can be accomplished with complexity-based
cryptography by ﬁrst examining a result showing that one-way permutations that
are NP-complete to invert are not likely to exist. In Subsection 2.2 we examine a
method of determining the “usual” complexity of a problem.
We say that a cryptographic system is complexity-based if its security is derived
from the belief that breaking it will lead to an efﬁcient algorithm for a problem
complete in a complexity class that is believed not to have efﬁcient algorithms.
If an algorithm can solve a problem complete in a complexity class, it can then
solve any problem in that complexity class. In that spirit, when we say that a one-
way function is NP-hard to invert, we mean that given an oracle that inverts it,
a deterministic Turing Machine can use the oracle to decide an NP-hard problem
in polynomial time. If inverting the function is NP-hard and can be written as a
decision problem in NP, then we say that the function is NP-complete to invert.
In this section, we discuss limits to what can be accomplished with complexity-
based cryptography. Subsection 2.1 shows that there exists a function computed
by a polynomial-time bounded deterministic Turing machine with an oracle that
inverts a one-way permutation, Pf −1
, where f is a one-way permutation, that is in
NP ∩ coNP [Bra79]. Assuming, as is commonly believed, that NP  = coNP, this
means that a cipher cannot be NP-hard to invert. For this reason, in Chapter 4,
we propose a function that is weaker than a one-way permutation and is strongly
related to an NP-hard problem. This function is likely the function with the most
applications based on complexity possible because of Brassard’s theorem [Bra79].CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 11
This is because as functions require stronger assumptions, they are able to be ap-
plied to more applications. We also discuss another issue that arises with compl-
exity-based cryptography. The issue is that while complexity classes are based on
worst-case complexity, cryptography requires that all but an asymptotically negli-
gible number of instances be hard.
2.1 One-way Permutations are Not NP-hard to Invert
We start with a 1979 result by Brassard that suggests that basing cryptography
on NP-hardness may be futile [Bra79]. Speciﬁcally, Brassard shows that if any one-
to-one one-way function whose input size is bounded on the size of the output is
NP-hard to invert, then NP = coNP. It follows that one-way permutations cannot
be shown NP-complete under the usual assumptions. For this result, the domain
(which is a set of strings—i.e., a language) of the one-way function must be in NP
and the range (also a language) of the one-way function must be in coNP. When
the domain of the function is in NP; a Turing machine must be able to decide in
nondeterministic polynomial time if an input is valid for the function. In most
cases, where any string is a valid input, this is trivially true.
Brassard does not show this result directly, but rather shows a speciﬁc result
for the discrete logarithm problem and sketches it for factoring, simply stating
that it generalizes. It is worthwhile to take the time to understand how the gener-
alization works because this is fundamental to understanding the computational
complexity of breaking cryptographic systems. The domain of a one-way function
is a binary string that can be interpreted as an integer. The decision problem is
speciﬁed as follows: Given y,t such that f(x) = y, is x > t? Brassard’s result is
that this problem is in coNP. In order to show this, he must show that there is aCHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 12
succinct witness that there is no x such that x > t. Since the function is one-to-one,
it is sufﬁcient to show that there exists an x′ such that f(x′) = y and x′ ≤ t. This x′
serves as a witness that there is no x such that f(x) = y and x > t by the pigeon-
hole principle. Therefore this problem is in coNP. Brassard goes on to show that if
an NP-complete problem is in coNP, then NP=coNP.
Note that Brassard’s result only applies to functions that are one-to-one. In con-
trast, Kozen showed a simple example of a one-way function that is not one-to-one
but is NP-hard to invert [Koz06]. One-to-one one-way functions are known as one-
way permutations. Impagliazzo and Rudich showed that if P  = NP then one-way
permutations cannot be used as black boxes for stronger cryptographic primitives
such as key agreement [Rud88, IR89]. One-way permutations trivially imply one-
way functions as every one-way permutation is a one-way function. It remains
open whether one-way permutations can be constructed from one-way functions.
The above result that one-way permutations cannot be shown NP-complete un-
der commonly held assumptions while one-way functions exist that can be shown
NP-complete would tend to suggest that no such black-box construction exists.
Akavia et al. show that if a one-way function is NP-hard to invert in the aver-
age case, then coNP ⊆ AM [AGGM06]. The complexity class AM is the class of all
problems that have two-round interactive proof systems. It is generally believed
that coNP is not a subset of AM so this is an even stronger result suggesting that it
is not possible to construct a one-way function that is NP-hard to invert in the av-
erage case. This result was built on results by Feigenbaum and Fortnow [FF93] and
Bogdanov and Trevisan [BT03]. Our system is weaker than a one-way function.
Although we cannot build a one-way function that is NP-hard on average to
invert, Ajtai has discovered a relationship between average-case complexity and
worst-case complexity for lattice problems that can be used to build cryptographicCHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 13
primitiveswhicharesecure iftheLLLalgorithm isoptimal ornearlyoptimal[Ajt04,
Mic07]. This suggests that our approach to complexity-based cryptography can be
made to succeed at least in some cases.
2.2 Generic Complexity
Complexity classes deal with worst-case complexity. In worst-case complexity,
a problem is considered to be hard even if only a small number of its instances
are hard. Another way of measuring complexity, called average-case complexity,
is also not satisfactory as a system is not cryptographically strong if a signiﬁcant
minority of its instances are easy to break. A cryptographer wants to base a system
on a problem for which breaking almost every instance is hard. This concept is
captured by generic complexity [GMMU07]. A language L ⊆ Σ∗ is said to have
genericcomplexityO(f(n)) if, forallbuta negligiblesubset of Σn, L canbe decided
in O(f(n)) time for a given measure. The deﬁnition of generic complexity requires
that a measure function be deﬁned on the problem in order for “negligible” to be
deﬁned. There are different deﬁnitions of “negligible” depending on how strongly
generic a function is, but generally it is based on taking the limit as the size goes to
inﬁnity. Theusefulnessofa genericcomplexity result dependson howwell-chosen
the measure is for the setting at hand.
A problem is said to be generically in a complexity class for a given measure if,
except for a negligible density, the problem has an algorithm that ﬁts the deﬁnition
of an algorithm for that complexity class. This means that if a problem is generi-
cally polynomial time, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm which will solve
all but a negligible number of instances of that problem. If a problem is generi-
cally NP, then there is a nondeterministic-polynomial-time algorithm for all but aCHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 14
negligible number of instances of that problem.
Many problems that are hard in the worst-case and even some that are un-
decidable have generically polynomial time algorithms relative to some natural
measure. This means that it is not enough for cryptographic security to prove the
complexity of breaking a system in the worst-case, security based on complexity
must also be shown to be hard generically, or at least not be generically polynomial
time, in order for the security to be derived from the complexity class. Since it is
not known how to prove a cryptosystem secure if problems in a complexity class
are difﬁcult, this additional requirement makes it even more unlikely that it will
be possible to prove a cipher difﬁcult to break based on complexity.
An example of a one-way function that is NP-complete to invert, but is gener-
ically easy to invert, is the function used by Kozen [Koz06]. This function takes
a Boolean formula and a set of assignments as inputs then outputs the Boolean
formula and the result of the evaluation of the formula using the assignments as
outputs. This function is NP-complete to invert because it is possible to convert
any instance of SAT to a value in the range of the function and then read a witness
from the input. However, for any natural measure on all but a negligible number
of outputs, ﬁnding an input that makes the output true is easy [GMMU07].Chapter 3
Deﬁnitions and Models of
Computation
This chapter contains many of the deﬁnitions used in this thesis including def-
initions related to the models of computation used to determine complexity or ex-
pected complexity. The deﬁnitions in this chapter that are deﬁned in other works
are presented with sufﬁcient detail for their use in this thesis; where more detailed
deﬁnitions exist, they may be obtained from the cited sources.
3.1 Turing Machines
A deterministicTuring machine is a model of computation described in texts such
as [HMU01, Pap95, Koz06, DSW94] that consists of an alphabet Σ, a tape, a set of
states, a transition function, and a tape alphabet which includes a space symbol.
The transition function shows how to change conﬁgurations by taking a symbol
(under the tape read/write head) and a state to return a new symbol (to be writ-
ten), a new state, and a direction to move the read/write head. A nondeterministic
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Turing machine is like a deterministic Turing machine except that there is a transi-
tion relation rather than a function. A deterministic Turing machine is in a single
conﬁguration at any given time while a nondeterministic Turing machine may be
in multiple conﬁgurations simultaneously. These multiple conﬁgurations can al-
ternatively be described as choosing from among multiple successor states and
always choosing “correctly”. Starting from a conﬁguration of a nondeterministic
Turing machine and selecting only one subsequent conﬁguration from the possible
subsequent conﬁgurations from the transition relation, and continuing to do this
recursively, yields a path of computation. A deterministic Turing Machine is said
to accept its input if it halts in an accepting state while a nondeterministic Turing
Machine is said to accept its input if at least one path of computation halts in an
accepting state. Likewise a deterministic Turing machine rejects its input if it halts
in a rejecting state while a nondeterministic Turing Machine rejects its input if all
paths of computation halt in a rejecting state.
Alternating Turing machines may be found in texts such as [Koz06]. An alter-
nating Turing machine uses a relation rather than a function for the transition func-
tion like a nondeterministic Turing machine. This results in a tree of conﬁgurations
for an input. States in an alternating Turing machine may be labeled with a ¬, a
∨ or a ∧ so that conﬁgurations may alternate between the closest higher conﬁgu-
ration on the tree being a ∨ and a ∧. A ¬ label indicates that the value of children
should be reversed. There may be a ﬁnite number of alternations. A ∧ means that
all computation paths descending from the current conﬁguration must accept for
the path to accept and a ∨ means that at least one computation path descending
from the current conﬁguration must accept in order for the path to accept.
A probabilistic Turing machine is a Turing machine with an additional tape of
random bits that may be read sequentially and not written [Koz06]. The resultingCHAPTER 3. DEFINITIONS AND MODELS OF COMPUTATION 17
computation may be a function of the random bits as well as the input. If two
probabilistic Turing machines have the same random bits, same states, and same
transition function we call them random clones.
An oracle Turing machine as deﬁned in [Koz06] is a Turing machine with an
oracle tape. The oracle Turing machine may write strings to the oracle tape and
enter a special state where the oracle replies by writing a single symbol to the
oracle tape which may be read.
A language L ⊆ Σ∗ is a (possibly inﬁnite) set of strings written with the alphabet
Σ. A class is a (possibly inﬁnite) set of languages [HMU01, DSW94]. A language
L ⊆ Σ∗ is decided by a Turing machine, M, if for any x ∈ L as input, M halts in an
accepting state and for any x′ / ∈ L, M halts in a rejecting state [HMU01, DSW94].
Turing machine A simulates Turing machine B if A produces the same output as
B [Lyn96].
3.2 Complexity Classes
Information on complexity (including NP-completeness) is available in Garey
and Johnson’s 1979 book [GJ79] as well as more modern texts1 [Pap95, Koz06,
Koz92].
Recall that a class is a (possibly inﬁnite) set of languages [HMU01, DSW94].
A complexity class is a class whose membership is determined by the existence of
a Turing machine or an instance of another speciﬁed model of computation with
some speciﬁed property or resource bound that can decide languages within the
class. Many complexity classes, such as P and NP, are deﬁned by the model of
1[GJ79] contains reductions for many NP-complete problems. [Pap95] focuses on NP. [Koz06]
discusses many complexity classes and prerequisites may be found in [Koz92], a quarter of which
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computation required to solve it in polynomial time.
Given a language L ⊆ Σ∗ and a set of valid instances: U ⊆ Σ∗, the complement
of L is L ⊆ U such that:
x ∈ L ⇔ x / ∈ L
Given a class C, coC is the set of languages which are complements of languages
in C [Koz06].
A function f : N  → N is said to be polynomially bounded if there exist k,c ∈ N
such that n > c ⇒ f(n) < nk [Koz06]. The complexity classes P and NP
can be found in many texts [GJ79, Pap95, Koz06]. The complexity class P is the
class of languages which can be decided by a deterministic Turing machine in a
polynomially-bounded number of conﬁgurations. The complexity class NP is the
class of languages which can be decided by a nondeterministic Turing machine
with each computation path having a polynomially-bounded number of conﬁgu-
rations.
The complexity class ΣP
k isthe class oflanguages which can be decided by an al-
ternating Turing machine with each computation path having a polynomial num-
ber of conﬁgurations starting with a ∨ and having at most k alternations. Similarly,
ΠP
k is the class of languages that can be decided by an alternating Turing Machine
starting with a ∧ and having at most k alternations. NP = ΣP
1 and coNP = ΠP
1.
The polynomial hierarchy, PH, is the class of languages which are accepted by ΣP
k or
ΠP
k for some k [Koz06]. PSPACE is the class of languages that can be decided by a
Turing Machine using a polynomially-bounded on the size of the input amount of
space on its tape [Koz06].
Logspace and polynomial reducibility are deﬁned in many texts [GJ79, Pap95,
Koz06]. Given a language A ⊆ Σ∗ and a language B ⊆ ∆∗, A is logspace re-CHAPTER 3. DEFINITIONS AND MODELS OF COMPUTATION 19
ducible to B, denoted A ≤
log
M B, if there exists a function σ : Σ∗  → ∆∗ which
can be computed by a deterministic Turing machine using ⌈log2 n + 1⌉ space for
n input symbols. Similarly A is polynomially-reducible to B and written A ≤P
M B
if σ can be computed in a polynomially-bounded number of conﬁgurations on a
deterministic Turing machine.
The idea of completeness is discussed in many standard texts [GJ79, Pap95,
Koz92, Koz06]. A language L is complete for a complexity class C, denoted C-
complete, if X ∈ C ⇔ X ≤
log
M L and L ∈ C. If every language in C is reducible to L
(but L maynot be in C) then L issaid to be C-hard. Likewise we say that a language
L is polynomially complete for a complexity class C if L ∈ C and X ∈ C ⇔ X ≤P
M L.
Note that all languages that are C-complete are C-hard.
The counting problem on a language is the integer valued function that takes an
instance andreturns thenumberofwitnesses thatmake ittrue. For anyinteger val-
ued function whose range can be bounded by a function g : Σ∗  → N, computable
in a polynomially-bounded number of conﬁgurations, f : Σ∗  → N, there is an or-
acle ≥f that takes as its input x#t and writes “yes” if f(x) ≥ t or “no” if f(x) < t.
Using binary search [Knu98, AHU74, CLRS01], a Turing Machine with the oracle
≥f can output the value f(x) in ⌈log2 g(x) + 1⌉ oracle queries. The complexity
class #P is the class of languages decidable in a polynomially-bounded number of
conﬁgurations of a deterministic Turing Machine relative to an oracle ≥#L where
#L is the number of witnesses for an instance of L ∈ NP [Koz06]. For example,
the counting problem on SAT is the number of truth assignments that satisfy the
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3.3 Oracle Notation
The class CO of languages is deﬁned to be the set of languages that are in the
class C using Turing machines with access to an oracle O. This is called C relative to
O. If O is a language, then we are considering an oracle that decides that language;
if O is a class of languages, then it is an oracle that decides every language in the
class, i.e., a language complete for the class [Koz06, DSW94].
3.4 Zero Knowledge
A protocol for proving a proposition is zero knowledge if the veriﬁer, with no
more information than the proposition to be demonstrated, can produce tran-
scripts identically distributed to those that are produced by the interaction be-
tween the prover and the veriﬁer [MvOV97].
3.5 Set Membership
In this section, we deﬁne secure set membership systems. A secure set member-
ship system consists of two protocols. First, the set must be established. Later, hold-
ers of set elements can prove their elements’ set membership to others. Depending
on the application, it may be desirable for the proof to reveal the set element or to
keep it secret. Speciﬁcally, we have the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 1. A set establishment protocol is a protocol carried out by some number
m of participants P1,..., Pm. Each Pi holds as an input set element wi. The output of
the protocol is a set representation T = T(w1,...,wm). If the system is randomized,
then each participant also gets a string of random bits.CHAPTER 3. DEFINITIONS AND MODELS OF COMPUTATION 21
In our system, the set establishment protocol also takes a string of random
bits that guide its nondeterministic choices. Thus the function looks like: T =
T(r,w1,...,wm) where r is a string of random bits. These random bits are avail-
able to all participants and may be public.
Deﬁnition 2. A set membership protocol is a protocol carried out by a participant
P holding a set element w and a veriﬁer V holding a set representation T. An
honest veriﬁer accepts if and only if the representation T was generated from a set
of elements including w, even if P is cheating. The veriﬁer may learn w.
Obviously, the set membership protocol is unsuitable for credential systems in
which the set elements are reusable credentials, because it allows both V (and pos-
sibly eavesdroppers) to learn w and thereby to masquerade as P in the future to
others. The protocol is also unsuitable for anonymous credential systems unless
further measures are taken, because it allows V to distinguish between different
provers because they have differing credentials. Fortunately, both of these difﬁ-
culties can be eliminated by using a proof of possession protocol, deﬁned below,
instead of a set membership protocol.
Deﬁnition 3. A proof of possession protocol is a protocol carried out by a participant
P holding a set element w and a veriﬁer V holding a set representation T. An hon-
est veriﬁer accepts if and only if the representation T was generated from a set of
elements including w, even if P is cheating. The veriﬁer V does not learn w, even
if V is cheating. The veriﬁer, with no information other than the set representation
and the knowledge that the prover has a valid element of the set, can simulate the
prover, generating the same transcript as would be generated by the valid inter-
action between the prover and veriﬁer. This property is called zero knowledge (see
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In Deﬁnition 3, we assume all participants are computationally bounded. In
our system, the elements of the set are interpreted as assignments to a set of vari-
ables. These assignments are called witnesses, because in our proposed solutions
they are witnesses to the satisﬁability of 3SAT expressions. Our solutions depend
on the computational infeasibility of ﬁnding witnesses for certain 3SAT expres-
sions (also called instances). We discuss the validity of this assumption further in
Section 4.4.
When we discuss a 3SAT instance, we pay attention to two parameters. These
are the number ℓ of variables and the number n of clauses, which is also called the
size of the instance. We also consider the clause density α = n
ℓ, which isan important
parameter for determining the difﬁculty of a 3SAT instance [ABS03]. We refer to
a 3SAT instance that represents the set of elements as a set representation or, when
clear from context, simply as a set.Chapter 4
Secure Set Membership Using 3SAT
In this chapter, we describe our secure set membership protocols. We ﬁrst de-
scribe in Section 4.1 a centralized process for a trusted party to establish a set rep-
resentation for a set of given elements. In Section 4.2, we describe a distributed
version of the set establishment protocol, which can be carried out by the partic-
ipants holding set elements and does not require a centralized trusted party. In
Section 4.3, we describe how to show set membership for elements of the estab-
lished set. We discuss the security of our solutions in Section 4.4.
4.1 Centralized Set Establishment Protocol
Let W = {w1,w2,    ,wm} be a set of assignments to ℓ variables, {v1,...,vℓ}.
Each wi represents an individual element called a witness. The trusted party, say
T , generates a set representation for W—that is, a 3SAT instance satisﬁed by each
wi ∈ W. To do this, T repeatedly generates random clauses that are the conjunc-
tion of 3 literals over variables in V. T checks each clause generated to determine
whetheritissatisﬁed byevery wi ∈ W. Ifthereissome wi ∈ W thatdoesnot satisfy
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the clause, then T discards the clause and randomly selects a replacement clause
which goes through the same test. Once n satisﬁed clauses are found, where n is
a security parameter representing the desired size of the expression, their conjunc-
tion forms the desired set representation T, which is output by T . The complete
algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
Note that the output T is an instance of the 3SAT problem satisﬁed by the as-
signments that the participants have speciﬁed as elements. It may also be satisﬁed
by some other unknown assignments. However, even if there are such spurious
witnesses, that does not mean they are easy for an attacker to ﬁnd. Nonetheless, it
seems desirable to avoid having many such spurious witnesses. One can reduce
the number of spurious witnesses by choosing a large n, because the probability
of a given assignment satisfying a 3SAT instance decreases exponentially with the
size of the instance. Speciﬁcally, n should be chosen to be large enough to satisfy
three security criteria:
• The conjunction of the clauses should be satisﬁed by very few assignments
that are not valid elements.
• The size of the conjunctive normal form (CNF) expression that is made by
the clauses should be large enough that there is high probability that it is not
an instance of SAT for which an efﬁcient solution is known.
• The size of the CNF expression should be large enough that it can potentially
be computationally infeasible to ﬁnd satisfying assignments.
In general, this can be accomplished by choosing a suitably large number of vari-
ables and setting the clause density to a suitable value. The value for m is a param-
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clause density is chosen to be something believed to be hard. The security of the
scheme is discussed further in Section 4.4.
Input: A set of variable assignments W = {w1,w2,    ,wm} to ℓ variables and
the target number n of clauses.
Output: A 3SAT instance satisﬁed by all w ∈ W.
While there are fewer than n clauses do:
1. Select three different random numbers {i1,i2,i3} ∈ {1,...,ℓ}.
2. Select three random bits n1,n2,n3. For each bit nj, if nj = 0, the literal vij is
added to the clause; if nj = 1, the literal ¬vij is added to the clause instead.
3. If another clause has the same three variables and corresponding negations
and return to Step 1.
4. For each wj do
If, for all i ∈ {i1,i2,i3} ((ni = 1 and vi is set in wj) or (ni = 0 and vi
is not set in wj)) then goto Step 1.
5. Add the clause represented by {(n1,vi1),(n2,vi2),(n3,vi3)} to the instance.
Algorithm 1: A centralized protocol for establishing a set
We now turn our attention to the computational complexity of this algorithm.
We note that there is some chance that the algorithm might not even terminate,
if there are not a sufﬁcient number of available clauses that satisfy the given wit-
nesses. However, if ℓ is chosen relatively large in comparison to m, and ℓ is sufﬁ-
ciently large compared to m and n, there should be a sufﬁcient number of clauses
that satisfy the witnesses. In order to make it possible for the algorithm to termi-
nate, we need the following condition to hold:
n ≤
￿
8
ℓ!
(ℓ − 3)!
((7/8)m)
￿
The right hand side of the equation is the total number of possible clauses multi-CHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 26
plied by the fraction of the clauses that will be accepted. This gives the number of
clauses that may be included in the ﬁnal instance. It is desirable to choose ℓ based
on security requirements. Finding witnesses is conjectured to be exponential in ℓ
for at least some instances [GJ79]. A discussion of how to choose n follows.
Assuming a large number of clauses satisfy the given witnesses, consider a
particular witness representing one set element and consider a single randomly
chosen 3SAT clause. There are three variables in a clause, all of which are given
some assignment in the witness. Each variable in the clause can appear as a literal
in eitherpositive ornegative form, so there are eight possible cases. Of these, seven
are satisﬁed by the witness; it is only not satisﬁed (and therefore not accepted) in
the case where none of the three literals are satisﬁed. Thus, the probability of a
clause satisfying one witness is 7
8. If there are m witnesses, then the probability of
a clause satisfying all of them is (7
8)m. It follows that the expected number of tries
required to generate a clause in the set representation is (8
7)m. It takes O(logℓ) bits
to represent a clause and the clause must be checked against m witnesses, each of
which can be done in constant time. Therefore, it takes O(mlogℓ) time to test a
clause to determine whether it is satisﬁed by all the witnesses.
In order to generate n clauses, it is necessary to ﬁnd n distinct clauses that are
satisﬁed by W. As each clause is found, it becomes slightly harder to ﬁnd the next
clause, as duplicates will sometimes be chosen. However, as long as n is very small
relative to the total number of clauses that satisfy W, this has a negligible effect. If
the probability that a random chosen clause passes both tests (satisﬁes W and is
not a duplicate) were ﬁxed at (7
8)m, then the expected running time to generate a
set representation would be O(n((8
7)m)mlogℓ). We note that in cases where n is a
signiﬁcant fraction of the total number of clauses that satisfy W, then this would
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In practice, this means that it is only computationally efﬁcient to generate an in-
stance for atmost up to around a hundred witnesses. Ahundred witnesses leadsto
an expectation of 629,788 rejected clauses per accepted clause, easily doable with
current computers. When the number of witnesses reaches a hundred and ﬁfty,
there is an expectation of about ﬁve hundred million rejected clauses for each ac-
cepted clause, probably infeasible for a typical modern computer for even a small
number of clauses.
4.2 Distributed Set Establishment Protocol
We now discuss the distributed protocol for establishing T, which is given in
Algorithm 2. This algorithm works for honest-but-curious participants, who are
assumed to follow their speciﬁed protocols but who may pool their information
to try to learn more than they are supposed to. It also has some resilience against
cheating participants who do not follow the protocol; for example, cheating parties
can cause an easy instance of 3SAT to be chosen, but in some cases the other par-
ticipants can detect that this may be happening. We will discuss security further
in Section 4.4. At a high level, the protocol executes as follows: the participants
locally generate local copies of the same random clause. Each determines if the
clause is satisﬁed by her own witness and communicates this information to the
others. If the clause is satisﬁed by all the witnesses, it is kept. Otherwise, it is
discarded.
In order to protect the participants’ witnesses from being disclosed, we use a
veriﬁable secret-ballot election scheme by Benaloh [Ben87]. The scheme is based
on homomorphic encryption and secret sharing. It operates by designating some par-
ticipants as tellers. Participants give secret shares of their votes to the tellers. TheCHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 28
Input: A set of variable assignments W = {w1,w2,    ,wm}. Each wi is known to
participant Pi. All participants also know the number ℓ of variables to be used and the
target number n of clauses, as well as a sufﬁciently long random string R.
Output: An instance of 3SAT that is satisﬁed by all participants’ witnesses.
• set i := 0,
maxrejectbase :=
￿8
7
￿m
8
 
S + logn
8log 8
7
clauses :=
$
8ℓ(ℓ − 1)(ℓ − 2)
￿8
7
￿m
%
• While there are fewer than n clauses do:
1. maxreject := maxrejectbase clauses
(clauses−i), i := i + 1
2. Using R, select three different variables i1,i2,i3 and three ﬂags n1,n2,n3.
3. Construct the clause where the ﬂags denote the negation of variables.
4. If the clause is equivalent to a clause already generated, discard it and return
to Step 2.
5. Hold a veriﬁable secret-ballot election (see [Ben87]) using “yes” if the clause is
satisﬁed by the witness and “no” otherwise. If the tally is unanimously “yes”,
then add the clause to the instance. Otherwise, delete it. Each teller should
maintain a running sum of each participant’s shares of votes.
6. return to Step 2.
• Use the homomorphic property to compute the number of “no” votes for each par-
ticipant. If one or more exceeds maxreject, discard all the clauses.
Algorithm 2: A distributed algorithm
tellers then use the homomorphic properties of the secret-sharing scheme to com-
pute shares of the tally. They then collaborate to compute the actual tally and
provide a proof to the participants that the tally was computed correctly.
In order to detect cheating of individual participants in our scheme, the tellers
count the number of times that any participant votes “no” for any given clause.
This can be accomplished without revealingthe votes to the tellers by using the ho-
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each participant’s votes and collaborate to determine that sum after a clause is cho-
sen. If this sum exceeds a threshold value maxreject, then the instance is discarded
and the protocol restarted from the beginning. The maxreject formula requires a
security parameter; we suggest S = 18 or S = 19 for our recommended param-
eters. Depending on the application setting for the protocol, it may be desirable
to exclude participants who have exceeded the maxreject threshold some number
of times from further participation. We note that even if a cheating participant
succeeds in inﬂuencing the outcome of the protocol, she can neither learn another
participant’s witness nor cause another participant’s witness to not satisfy the re-
sulting 3SAT instance.
The goal is to choose maxreject high enough so that it detects cheating at levels
that could lead to malicious participants being able to break the security of the
result, but low enough so that it does not unnecessarily restart the protocol when
no participants are cheating.
In order to heuristically determine a good value for maxreject for a given round,
we need to know what the total number of possible clauses is. This is:
clauses =
￿
ℓ!/(ℓ − 3)!
(8/7)m
￿
Deﬁne i as the current round and S as a security parameter. As a threshold, we
suggest:
maxreject =
 ￿8
7
￿m
8
 
(S + logn)
8log 8
7
!
clauses
(clauses − i)
which is derived as follows. As mentioned previously, the probability of a random
clause satisfying a given witness is 7
8. The ﬁrst term of the formula for maxreject is
the inverse of the probability of all the witnesses being satisﬁed for a single clauseCHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 30
divided by the number of them that a single witness rejects. This is not sufﬁcient
to give a useful probability of an honest run not being rejected because there are
n clauses yielding a probability that all n are satisﬁed of 2−n. We multiply by the
logarithm of the number of witnesses converted to logarithm base 8
7 and divide
by 8 (to convert from elections to rejections) in order to bring the probability up to
one half that all the clauses will be accepted. A security parameter is added in this
process to bring the probability to the desired level. It is necessary to use a higher
security parameter with fewer witnesses. Multiplying by the ratio between the
total possible clauses and the remaining possible clauses scales the total number
of clauses that may be considered to account for clauses that have already been
chosen. If i = clauses then there are no more clauses to add and the ratio cannot be
computed.
This choice of maxrejectexperimentally seems to be a good choice. See Figures 1
and 2. These ﬁgures show the relationship between the actual number of clauses
rejected and the value from the maxreject formula. You will note that the actual
number of tries is below maxreject but that some of them approach maxreject. The
graph 1 alsoshows the curve for maxreject. This curve grows as the possible clauses
get used up. The graph 2 plots the actual number of tries for each clause. These
vary considerably, but tend to stay under a certain curve. We tried to capture this
curve with maxreject.
We recommend a value of S between 18 and 21. The larger values should be
used with a smaller number of witnesses. These recommendations are based on
experiments using our recommended parameters.
To provide termination and also to provide some protection against multiple
cheating participants colluding and “spreading out” their “no” votes in order not
to individually exceed the maxrejectthreshold, it would also be a good idea to haveCHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 31
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Figure 1: Values of maxreject: maxreject for ℓ = 128,n = 1024,m = 50 using the
formula in Algorithm 2.
a check in each iteration of the while loop that the loop has not been executed too
many times, and to abort the protocol if this occurs.
In our set establishment protocol, the participants have a public shared source
R of random or pseudorandom numbers. A theoretical model of algorithms exe-
cuting with shared random information can be obtained with our notion of ran-
dom clones in Section 3.1, or with the concept of random beacons [Rab83, Ben87].
If there are at least two witnesses, then R may be public. Using R, each participant
generates a clause as the disjunction of three elements. Since the same random
source is used, all the participants generate the same clause. The participants hold
a veriﬁable secret-ballot election. If the tally is unanimously “yes”, the clause is
kept; otherwise, it is rejected. If any participant votes “no”, then the clause is dis-
carded. This process is repeated until the target number n of clauses has beenCHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 32
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Figure 2: Highest experimental rejections for ℓ = 128,n = 1024,m = 50.
generated.
It is easy to verify that the output T is satisﬁed by all the inputs w1,...,wm, so
Algorithm 2 meets the deﬁnition of a set establishment protocol. Assuming that
parties behave honestly, the expected number of tries to ﬁnd a clause is (8
7)m as in
the centralized protocol of Section 4.1.
4.3 Set Membership
Our set representations lend themselves easily to both set membership and
proof of possession protocols.
Set membership involves a participant P, who knows his element w, and a
veriﬁer V, who knows T. P wants to convince V that T was generated as a set
representation including the element w. In our case, then, P wants to convince VCHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 33
that w satisﬁes T.
A straightforward set membership protocol (in which V is allowed to commu-
nicate w to P, as per the deﬁnitions in Chapter 3), is for P to communicate w to V,
who can then easily check in polynomial time whether w satisﬁes T. If it does, V
accepts; otherwise, V rejects.
For proof of possession, it is important that the veriﬁer never learns the cre-
dentials and cannot impersonate the prover. Fortunately, in our solution, it is not
necessary to present the element to show set membership, but rather it is sufﬁcient
to prove that one knows a satisfying string. This can be done without revealing
the witness via a zero knowledge proof. There are simple zero knowledge proofs
for 3SAT satisﬁability that rely on factoring [BC87, Ben87]. Zero knowledge proofs
are also possible using trapdoor one-way functions through a generic construc-
tion that applies to any NP-complete problem [GMW87]. Furthermore, this can be
made secure against quantum computers [Wat06], in keeping with our motivation
to avoid reliance on number-theoretic assumptions.
There are a number of parameters that must be set for our algorithms to work.
These include the number of witnesses, ℓ, the clause density, α, and from these the
number of clauses, n = αℓ. These parameters affect the number of witnesses the
instance may hold, the efﬁciency of the system, and the security of the system. The
parameters generally need to be chosen with the security of the system in mind.
One potential problem which must be addressed when choosing parameters is
spurious witnesses. A spurious witness is a string that satisﬁes the instance but
was not a chosen witness. A random spurious witness does not compromise the
system, because it is as hard to ﬁnd as a legitimate witness. A spurious witness a
short Hamming distance from a chosen witness may compromise the system us-
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with the chosen witness to ﬁnd. We call these witnesses short-Hamming-distance
witnesses. Using alternate security deﬁnitions that require the prover to be a par-
ticipant, or authorized by a participant, rather than that the string be part of the set
establishment protocol eliminates short-Hamming-distance attacks as a security
issue because in order to conduct such an attack, one must know a chosen wit-
ness. Which set of security deﬁnitions should be used depends on the application.
To be as general as possible, we carry out our analysis with the strict deﬁnitions
presented in Section 3.5.
The number ℓ of variables is a key parameter for determining the size of the
instance that will be generated by the algorithm. Experimentally, we have deter-
mined that ℓ should be at least 8,192 but preferably 16,384. The larger ℓ is, the
larger the resulting instance is. Another parameter that needs to be set is α. We did
experiments to determine these parameters and constraints on the system. These
experiments are described in Section 4.4.
Experimentally, we have found that α ≥ 64 is necessary to prevent a SAT solver
called MiniSat (see page 38) from deciding the instance. We have also found that if
α becomes too large, then too much information is given, which also allows Min-
iSat to decide the instance. A larger α does provide additional protection against
the existence of spurious witnesses a short Hamming distance from a chosen wit-
ness. An estimate of the number of instances with spurious witnesses a short
Hamming distance away has been calculated and experimentally veriﬁed (see Sec-
tion 4.4.2 on page 44) to be: O(e−3α/7). For up to ﬁve witnesses, the number of spu-
rious witnesses a short Hamming distance away was experimentally determined
to be negligible with α = 64. We recommend using ℓ = 16,384 and α = 64.CHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 35
4.4 Security
The security of the set membership protocol and the proof of possession proto-
col depends on the difﬁculty of ﬁnding witnesses that satisfy a set representation
T constructed by the set establishment protocol. We show below in Theorem 1
that the representation T can be any of the instances of 3SAT with n clauses and ℓ
variables satisﬁed by the speciﬁed assignments W = {w1,...,wm}. The instance
T may possibly be satisﬁed by some other assignments. The probability that T is
hard is the same as the probability that it is hard to ﬁnd a witness for a such an
instance of 3SAT. Unfortunately, it is not known what this probability is. (In fact,
if P = NP, then the probability is zero.)
Our system rests on the assumption that a sufﬁciently large random instance
of 3SAT satisfying a given set of witnesses and having an appropriately chosen
clause density has a high probability of being hard to solve. If this assumption
holds, then it is hard for anyone to ﬁnd a witness that is not an element. It is also
hard for a party who does not already know an element of T to ﬁnd one. These
two properties provide the security for both the set membership protocol and the
proof of possession protocol. In particular, for the set membership protocol, the
ability of an adversary to succeed in forging a witness without overhearing one
is precisely the adversary’s ability to determine a satisfying assignment to T, be-
cause this property can be exactly checked by the veriﬁer. In the case of the proof
of possession protocol, the security additionally relies on the soundness of the zero
knowledge proof. An adversary who cannot ﬁnd a valid witness has only negligi-
ble probability of convincing the veriﬁer to accept.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 can generate any 3SAT instance consisting of n different clauses
that is satisﬁed by all the assignments in W. Algorithm 2 can also.CHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 36
Proof: The same argument applies to both Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, because
both algorithms save or reject clauses for the same reasons.
Consider the “random algorithm,” which simply has a list of all the possible
instances consisting of n distinct 3-literal clauses over ℓ variables that are satisﬁed
by all w ∈ W and selects one instance uniformly at random.
First, we show that our algorithm generates the same set of instances as the
random algorithm. Suppose a possible 3SAT instance (in the random algorithm’s
list) cannot be generated by our algorithm. Then a clause in it must be rejected
by our algorithm either because it is a duplicate or because some assignment does
not satisfy the clause. It cannot be a duplicate, as this violates the requirement
for the random algorithm’s list that the clauses be distinct. If some assignment
does not satisfy the clause, then no instance including that clause is satisﬁed by
the assignment. Therefore, including it would violate the condition for the random
algorithm’s list that it must be satisﬁed by W. Hence, all instances in the list drawn
on by the random algorithm are candidates for generation by our algorithm.
Conversely, suppose a 3SAT instance generated by our algorithm cannot be
generated by the random algorithm. Then there are two possible reasons. The
ﬁrst is that there is a duplicate clause resulting in the number of unique clauses
being less than n. This instance cannot be generated by our algorithm because
the duplicate clause will be suppressed. The other possible reason is that it is not
satisﬁed by one of the witnesses. In this case, one of the clauses is not satisﬁed by
that witness (as the instance is a conjunction of the clauses). This clause will be
rejected by our algorithm, so this instance cannot be generated. Therefore, the set
of instances selected by the random algorithm is exactly the set of instances that
our algorithm can generate.CHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 37
Theorem 1 states that, given ℓ and n, the system can generate any 3SAT instance
of ℓ variables with n clauses that is satisﬁed by the speciﬁed witnesses. We make
some observations and propose some heuristic recommendations for selecting the
security parameters as follows.
Beyond a certain threshold, increasing the number of variables without increas-
ing the number of clauses actually reduces security because there are not enough
instantiations of the variables to make the problem difﬁcult. This is why we focus
on the clause density rather than the number of clauses.
Recall that the clause density of an instance is deﬁned as α = n
ℓ. Alekhnovich
and Ben-Sasson [ABS03] show that if α ≤ 1.63, then the instance can be solved
in linear time. They also demonstrate empirically that α < 2.5 seems to be easy
to solve. We recommend taking α ≥ 64 (i.e., choosing n ≥ 64ℓ) for security. For
example, ℓ = 16,384 and n = 1,048,576. The size of the problem was selected
to be larger than the typical size of SAT-Race benchmarks and to correspond with
our suggested clause density [HS00, Sin06]. We carried out experiments with SAT
solvers to determine if problems of this size are easily solvable. We tested these
values experimentally for up to ﬁve witnesses and neither the MiniSat solver (see
page 38) nor short-Hamming-distance attacks could solve the instances.
The phase boundary of 3SAT is the clause density at which instances go abruptly
from beingmostly satisﬁable tomostly unsatisﬁable. The 3SAT decision problem—
determiningwhether a 3SAT instance issatisﬁable or not—isbelieved to behardest
when instances are just above the phase boundary [HS00]. However, our problem
is a little different. Our set representation instances are always satisﬁable (since
they are speciﬁcally chosen to satisfy a particular set of witnesses). The problem
at hand for an attacker is to ﬁnd a satisfying assignment. We conjecture that the
problem of ﬁnding satisfying assignments for instances that are known to be sat-CHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 38
isﬁable gets harder as the probability of a random instance of the same parameter
being satisﬁable gets smaller—i.e., well above the phase boundary.
A certain number of variables are trivial in any particular instance (i.e., because
they either do not appear in positive form or in negative form, and therefore it
is clear how to set them in a satisfying assignment). This can reduce the security
of the system, by making it easier for an adversary to ﬁnd satisfying assignments.
Additionally, once the trivial variables are assigned, an adversary can then remove
those clauses from consideration, potentially resulting in more trivial variables.
If our instances were random among all 3SAT instances with n clauses and ℓ
variables, then the expected number of trivial variables could be limited by taking
the clause density sufﬁciently large. However, as noted before, our instances are
random only among those 3SAT instances that are actually satisﬁed by the set W
of witnesses. Experimental results suggest that these instances are difﬁcult for a
small number of witnesses but become easier at an exponential rate as the number
of witnesses is increased. This is mitigated by having a large number of variables
(16,384). Still, with the exponential growth rate of trivial variables, it is not safe to
have more than ten witnesses.
SATLIB contains resources for experimental research on SAT and 3SAT, includ-
ing the results of competitions in solving random SAT instances [HS00]. In addi-
tion, there is an annual competition to create SAT solvers called SAT-Race [Sin06].
To date, not much progress has been made on high clause-density instances. We
did our experiments using the MiniSat solver which won SAT-Race 2006 and has
commercial backing from Cadence Design Systems which produces formal veriﬁ-
cation tools. SAT-decision algorithms have improved tremendously in recent years
on problems of interest to industrial applications such as formal veriﬁcation and
MiniSat has been at the forefront of the development [ES04, EB05, EMS07, Een07].CHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 39
We used the recent 2.0 version for the latest algorithms.
The SAT-races, like much of the SAT literature, are concerned with the decision
problem rather than the problem of ﬁnding witnesses. Finding witnesses using
the decision problem as an oracle requires solving many decision problems. If
some of these problems are intractable, it may not be possible to systematically
ﬁnd witnesses. We also note that there is an optimization variant of the SAT prob-
lem called MAXSAT [HS00, H˚ as01, KZ97]. Speciﬁcally, it is possible to approximate
3SAT by ﬁnding assignments that satisfy most, but not all clauses. Known algo-
rithms (e.g. [KZ97]) are polynomial time for ﬁnding an assignment that satisﬁes
7/8 of the clauses, but become exponential in the worst case when trying to do a
full assignment.1
One way to ﬁnd spurious witnesses is to try strings a short Hamming distance
from a legitimate witness. The reason is that changing a small number of vari-
ables has a better chance of satisfying the instance than a random string. In the
experiments described on Section 4.4.2 on page 44, we found such witnesses and
computed the likelihood of ﬁnding one with a given set of parameters by tally-
ing them for smaller instances and extrapolating. For a Hamming distance of 1 or
2, we have experimentally found 2e−3α/7 instances with spurious witnesses (see
Figure 3 on page 46) given one chosen witness. One might expect this formula to
have a factor of ℓ in it. This is not the case for two reasons. One is that if a spurious
witness is found with Hamming distance 1, there is a higher probability of spuri-
ous witnesses an additional Hamming distance from it. The second reason is that
instances which have spurious witnesses typically have many spurious witnesses.
These skews to the distribution give us relatively few instances with spurious wit-
1For both an algorithm to compute the 7/8-approximation and a proof that MAXSAT can be
solved in polynomial time if and only if P = NP, see Lecture 18 in [Koz06].CHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 40
nesses. One might also note that α ∼ 1
ℓ. Since we are multiplying α by a negative,
that means that the formula increases as the number of variables increase if the
number of clauses is kept constant.
Experiments with spurious witnesses at short Hamming distances suggest that
the number of witnesses should be further limited to 5. In these experiments, we
analyzed more than four million instances with varying parameters to determine
what parameters result in few short-Hamming-distance spurious witnesses as de-
scribed on Section 4.4.2 on page 44. The parameters varied include the clause den-
sity and the number of variables. If we relax the security deﬁnition to allow an
authorized user, rather than an authorized string, to prove membership, short-
Hamming-distance attacks cease to be a issue and the system can safely support
up to ten witnesses.
Italsodoesnot makeiteasierto solve the instance toput anupperbound on the
number of satisfying assignments. The unique satisﬁability problem (USAT) is the
SAT problem if it is known that there is no more than one satisfying assignment.
Finding a solution to an instance of USAT is as hard as SAT [VV85, Koz06]. Fur-
thermore, Valiant and Vazirani show that distinguishing between instances with
no solutions or one solution is as hard as SAT.
If there are spurious witnesses, then there are more witnesses than participants.
We would like to be able to check if this is the case because if we could, we could
rerun the protocol until only the selected witnesses satisfy the formula. Unfortu-
nately, counting the number of satisfying instances for a SAT problem is complete
for #P, the class of counting problems [CH96]. #P (see Section 3.2 on page 19) is a
hard class of problems as evidenced by the fact that a Turing machine with a #P
oracle can decide the polynomial hierarchy in deterministic polynomial time—that
is, PH ⊆ P#P [Tod89, Koz06]. This means that a deterministic Turing machine withCHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 41
an oracle that can count SAT solutions can decide languages that are ΣP
k-complete
or ΠP
k-complete for any k ∈ N. Since NP is ΣP
1 and coNP is ΠP
1 it gives a de-
terministic Turing machine with the oracle the ability to efﬁciently decide both
NP-complete and coNP-complete languages (see Section 3.2) [Koz06].
There are also combinatorial limits to consider. Although the security analysis
of the system dictates a much smaller number of witnesses than the combinatorial
maximum, we consider this maximum anyway. The number of possible clauses
for a set of witnesses is given by:
8ℓ(ℓ − 1)(ℓ − 2)
￿
7
8
￿m
For ℓ = 8,192 and n = 65,536, the combinatorial maximum number of wit-
nesses is 115. We suggest 50 as a practical maximum for the distributed algorithm
as the number of elections required by the distributed protocol greatly increases
as the system approaches its combinatorial limits. Each election requires computa-
tional and communications overhead. When m = 50, the system performs nicely,
but not securely, as can be seen in the experimental results in Figure 2. The prob-
lem with m = 50 isthat the resulting instances can be easilybroken bya SAT solver.
For this reason we suggest further restricting the witnesses to m = 5. The values
for maxreject are also shown in Figure 1 and were computed with S = 2. This
worked with our choice of a seed for the random number generator so that the ac-
tual number of rejections never exceeded maxreject. Experimental results suggest
that the system is only secure for 5 or fewer witnesses. 10 witnesses can be used
under an alternate security deﬁnition concerned with authorized users rather than
witnesses. At 20 witnesses, the system with ℓ = 8,192 can be solved in less than a
second. We could not experimentally solve systems with 10 or fewer witnesses us-CHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 42
ing the MiniSat solver even with weeks of computing time on a high-performance
cluster when ℓ = 8,192 and n = 65,536.
Multiple cheating participants might collude to try to “spread out” their cheat-
ing rejections so that they can inﬂuence the outcome without exceeding maxreject.
This can be compensated for by decreasing maxreject or by limiting the total num-
ber of rejections allowed cumulatively for all participants rather than for individ-
ual participants. However, this also increases the chance of “false positives,” in
which the protocol is restarted even without cheating behavior, so it is only likely
to work well for a small number of colluding participants. Having the protocol
restarted affects the efﬁciency of the system, while allowing too many rejections
affects the security of the system. It remains open to address other possibilities for
cheating and collusions.
4.4.1 Experiments
In all of our experiments, we assumed that the witnesses have a random dis-
tribution. If the witnesses do not have a random distribution, security issues may
occur depending on the distribution of the witnesses. Our experiments were all
carried out on a modern Sun Microsystems cluster consisting of AMD Opteron
processors. This state of the art equipment is at Stevens Institute of Technology.
Although the experiments were run on a cluster, they were single-threaded and
the only parallelism was that of running experiments simultaneously.
In one experiment, we generated instances with 8,192 variables, 524,288 clauses
and different numbers of witnesses. We ran MiniSat on these instances to see if
they could be decided. These experiments found that with 20 or more witnesses,
the instances could be decidedvery quickly. Furthermore, we found that itappearsCHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 43
to become exponentially easier to decide an instance as the number of witnesses
increases. From here, we were able to limit the number of chosen witnesses that
we may safely use against MiniSat to 10.
We did further experiments with MiniSat (see Section 4.4.3 on page 48). Al-
though one may be able to decide an instance without learning a witness, our
experiments determined if instances with different parameters may be decided ef-
ﬁciently by MiniSat. Since an instance may be tried for many hours without being
decided, but may be decided in some slightly longer amount of time, we chose
to err on the safe side when specifying the number of witnesses. First we ran
experiments with eight instances for four weeks to see if they can be decided in
that time. When they weren’t decided, we generated one hundred instances with
ten witnesses. We had already determined with small experiments that the more
witnesses an instance has, the more quickly it can be decided. We took one of
the ten witnesses and disallowed it by specifying against it in the instance. This
makes it easier for MiniSat to decide an instance. We gave MiniSat ﬁfty hours to
try to decide each instance. This was more than adequate given our experience
that instances which can be efﬁciently decided are decided in less than an hour.
The purpose of this experiment was to determine the safety of our recommended
parameters against the MiniSat program.
None ofthese were decided. Wealso did experiments with MiniSat for α = 128.
For the case of α = 128, instances were decided in a few seconds. With α = 64,
none of the 100 instances tried were decided in the allowed ﬁfty hours for 16,384
variables.
We also analyzed over four million smaller instances for short-Hamming-dis-
tance attacks as described in Section 4.4.2 on the following page. In addition, we
analyzed another two hundred thousand instances to verify that the experimentsCHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 44
done on the smaller instances reﬂect on the larger instances that we recommend in
our system.
The purpose of these experiments was to establish three facts. The ﬁrst was
to establish an inverse exponential relationship between the clause density and
the probability of an instance having a spurious witness. We expected this prob-
ability to be Θ(e−3α/7) for a single chosen witness. This was conﬁrmed by the
experiments. The second was to establish how many witnesses the system can
safely support. We set an arbitrary level of safety at one instance with a spurious
witness in ten thousand, with the intention of erring on the side of caution. In
order to render these results valid we had to establish a third fact, which is that
if the clause density is held constant, increasing the number of variables will not
increase the number of instances with spurious witnesses. This is important as
analyzing millions of instances with 16,384 variables is outside the capability of
modern computers. As an additional check we analyzed twelve instances with
16,384 variables and clause density 64 to Hamming distance 3 in parallel with the
other experiments.
4.4.2 Experiments With Short Hamming Distance Attacks
The short-Hamming-distance experiments consisted of three programs. These
programs all created instances by ﬁrst randomly choosing the witnesses and then
runningthe centralizedprotocol. Theﬁrst program analyzedinstanceswith a ﬁxed
number of variables for all integer values of α from 8 to 128. For each value of α,
it tried short-Hamming-distance attacks for 10,000 random instances and counted
how many instances had short-Hamming-distance witnesses. Figure 3 on page 46
contains the number of instances with spurious witnesses with Hamming distanceCHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 45
1 or 2 found for 10,000 runs for each value of α with 1 witness. This involved ana-
lyzing more than one million instances for each run. This experiment was done for
both 64 and 128 variables bringing the number of instances analyzed to 2 million.
The results for 64 and 128 variables were the same with small ﬂuctuations on in-
dividual data points reﬂecting the randomness of the instances. In both cases, the
data points corresponded to a probability of an instance having a spurious witness
of 2e−3α/7.
We performed the same experiment, again analyzing more than a million in-
stances, with ﬁve witnesses; see Figure 4 on page 47. Once again at α = 64 the
number of short-Hamming-distance spurious witnesses was negligible. With ten
witnesses (see Figure 5 on page 48) there was about one spurious witness for every
thousand instances when α = 64. We considered this too high and we recommend
against using 10 witnesses. These curves had the same shape as the curve for one
witness, but we were not able to determine a formula including the number of
witnesses. This formula is not necessary as long as we are able to determine the
probability of a spurious witness when α = 64.
These experiments were done with 64 variables. 64 variables sufﬁced because
we found with the second experiment (below) that the number of variables do
not affect the results as long as the clause density remains constant. After ﬁnding
that ten witnesses were too many, we restricted the system to ﬁve and not some
intermediate value between ﬁve and ten to provide a buffer rather than specifying
the system right up to our arbitrary level of safety of one instance with a spurious
witness in ten thousand. This cautious approach reﬂects the arbitrariness of the
threshold and the difﬁculty of measuring the probability that precisely.
The reason that we did the experiments with fewer variables is that the clause
density and the number of witnesses are the controlling variables, not ℓ. Our sec-CHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 46
ond program establishes this. To verify that the above results scale up to large
instances, the second program kept α constant and varied the number of variables
with 1,000 instances for each value of ℓ from 8 to 128 for a total of more than one
hundred thousand instances. This was sufﬁcient for establishing a ﬂat line rather
than a curve or a slope. We found that the number ofspurious witnesses ﬂuctuated
slightly around a ﬂat line as the value of ℓ varied. This suggests that as long as α
remains the same, the value of ℓ does not affect the number of spurious witnesses.
This was done for α = 8 and α = 16. Larger values of α generate too few spurious
witnesses to read the stability of the data through the noise.
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Figure 3: For each α, 10,000 instances with 1 chosen witness were tested for spuri-
ous witnesses at Hamming distance 1 or 2.
In parallel, using the third program we tested 12 instances with our recom-
mended parameters for spurious witnesses at Hamming distance 3 or less. None
of these large instances had a spurious witness at Hamming distance 3 or less.CHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 47
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Figure 4: For each α, 10,000 instances with 5 chosen witnesses were tested for
spurious witnesses at Hamming distance 1 or 2.
If short-Hamming-distance attacks are not a concern then our recommended pa-
rameters appear to be secure for up to 10 witnesses; otherwise, we found that our
parameters are secure for up to 5 witnesses. Systems with more than 10 witnesses
were found to be insecure. We also experimentally found that increasing α to 128
can result in instances that are easily solved by SAT solvers. This means that we
cannot increase the number of witnesses in our system.
One would not be concerned about such spurious witnesses when the provers
use a zero-knowledge proof of possession protocol and are trusted not to reveal
strings to unauthorized users. Spurious witnesses with a Hammingdistance great-
erthan three from anychosen witness are not a concern asthey are combinatorially
difﬁcult to ﬁnd as the number of possibilities increase.CHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 48
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Figure 5: For each α, 10,000 instances with 10 chosen witnesses were tested for
spurious witnesses at Hamming distance 1 or 2.
4.4.3 Experiments using MiniSAT
We generated four instances with one witness and four instances with ten wit-
nesses. These instances were generated by ﬁrst choosing the witnesses randomly
and then running the centralized protocol. None of these eight instances were
decided, although they ran on the high-performance cluster for more than four
weeks. Although it was too few instances to be conclusive, it showed that at least
some of the instances generated were hard. To get more conclusive results we ran
the following experiment.
We tried 100 instances with ten witnesses with ℓ = 16,384 and n = 1,048,576
also providing one of the witnesses. We provided the witness by appending to the
instance todisallowthatwitness. Thisexperimentwasboth todeterminethesafety
of the system against ﬁnding witnesses in general and to determine the safety ofCHAPTER 4. SECURE SET MEMBERSHIP USING 3SAT 49
the system against ﬁnding witnesses when a witness is already known.
This experiment determined if knowing one of the witnesses makes it easy
enough for MiniSAT to decide the instance by disallowing the known witness.
In smaller experiments, we found that this did make it easier for MiniSat to decide
an instance. However, with our suggested parameters, MiniSat was unable to de-
termine if there were any other witnesses for any of the instances. In fact, when the
experiments were terminated after at least 50 hours of runtime, MiniSat reported
that 0.0000% progress had been made. In some cases, the experiment was allowed
to run for as much as twice as long. In these cases no progress was made either.
This suggests that our system is secure against the MiniSat solver using our sug-
gested parameters and ten or fewer witnesses, but we found that as the number
of witnesses increases, it becomes easier for MiniSat to decide the instances, to the
point where at 20 witnesses it only takes a second. It is not possible to pinpoint
where between ten and twenty it becomes too easy, so we consider ten to be the
safe maximum against MiniSat.Chapter 5
Conclusion
We have presented a general solution to the set membership problem whose
security depends on the difﬁculty of ﬁnding witnesses to random 3SAT instances
satisfying a given set of witnesses. We have also presented applications to access
control, digital credentials, and timestamping. We have shown a distributed pro-
tocol for establishing a set.
A strong justiﬁcation for considering security based on 3SAT is the increased
worry that advances in conventional or quantum computing may one day yield
efﬁcient algorithms for problems such as factoring and discrete logarithms typi-
cally used as a source of hardness in cryptography. It is therefore important to
investigate cryptographic algorithms based on alternate (plausible) hardness as-
sumptions to provide resilience against “breaking” of any one assumption or class
of assumptions.
In 1979, Brassard showed that if a one-to-one bounded-input one-way function
can be shown NP-hard to invert, then NP = coNP [Bra79]. Our system is not
one-to-one and does not meet the standard deﬁnitions of one-way functions, so
Brassard’s result does not apply.
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Our protocol can be used for digital credentials including anonymous creden-
tials, timestamping, and other set membership applications. It can also be used
for applications where multiple users share an account. These include some ac-
cess control and ﬁnancial applications. For set membership applications like time-
stamping, the set representation can be thought of as a distributed signature. It can
be proven to any honest participant or observer using the set membership proto-
col that a document was used for inclusion in the set. These applications have
broad applicability to problems in cryptography and security. The advantages of
this method over one-way accumulators include not needing to remember a string
other than the one chosen by the user and not being dependent on the factoring
problem [BdM94].
As previously discussed, the expected number of clauses that must be tried to
generate a clause in the set representation is (8
7)m, where m is the number of wit-
nesses to be represented. We note that this probability depends on the number
of witnesses and is independent of n and ℓ. In contrast, the security of the sys-
tem is based on the adversary’s difﬁculty of ﬁnding an element as a function of
n and ℓ, so it may be possible to limit m so as to have efﬁcient solutions for the
participants without making the adversary’s task solvable. As described earlier in
Section 4.1, we believethat one hundred witnesses can be dealtwith easily, but that
as the number of witnesses begins to reach one hundred ﬁfty, it becomes infeasible
to generate an instance. It is important to remember that for our recommended
parameters, the system is not secure with more than ﬁve witnesses.
The space complexity for a set based on 3SAT is Θ(ℓlogℓ). For instance, a
system with 8,192 variables requires 65,536 clauses. Altogether, this requires 128
kilobytes of storage. For our recommended parameters, 256 kilobytes of storage
are required. This space complexity is independent of the number of set elements.CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 52
The secure set membership primitive solves the secure set membership prob-
lem. Secure set membership is a generalization of the problem solved by one-way
accumulators [BdM94]. Our secure set membership primitive uses a computa-
tional problem based on 3SAT that is not known to be efﬁciently computable by
either classical or quantum computers. We show how to generate this primitive
using a distributed protocol and how to prove possession of a set member without
revealing the string.
The secure set membership primitive is weaker than one-way functions, and
cannot be used to build one-way functions or more complicated primitives. Still,
it is our belief that by starting with a simple, weak primitive that more useful new
primitives will be developed, possibly using our complexity assumption.Bibliography
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